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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1145; overruled in Gates v. Seibert (1900) 157 Mo. 254,
57 S. W. 1065. The question whether the interests of the beneficiaries of
a trust are sufficiently vested or not is determined by the same rules that
apply in considering the rights of holders or prospective holders of legal
titles. Gray, op. cit. sec. 413. An indestructible trust which may last
more than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years after the entire
equitable interest under it has become indefeasibly vested is void. Fitchie
v. Brown (1906) 211 U. S. 321; Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown (1926) 105
Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555. The better view seems to be that this result is
based upon a special rule formed by analogy to the rule against perpetuities
rather than upon the rule itself. Gray, op. cit. sec. 1211; KALEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS sec. 658; and cf. Armstrong v. Barber (1909) 239 Ill. 389, 88
N. E. 246. The practical result of these cases is to throw into sharp re-
lief the great legal and practical differences between an indefeasibly vested
estate and an estate which is vested subject to being divested, although
both of these satisfy the rule, while the latter's closer analogy, an estate
whose vesting depends upon an indefinite contingency, does not.
There are two special types of trusts which frequently come into con-
flict with the rule against perpetuities. The spendthrift trust is obviously
a violation of the rule if it is to last for more than a life in being and
twenty-one years, because the beneficiary does not secure a vested interest
until the principal or income is actually paid over to him. Loud v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. (1922) 298 Mo. 148, 249 S. W. 629. A trust which
provides that all or part of the income shall be allowed to accumulate for a
certain period is not rendered void by the length of this period alone.
Thellusson v. Woodford (1805) 11 Vesey 112, 32 Eng. Repr. 1030; Gold-
tree v. Thompson (1889) 79 Cal. 613, 22 Pac. 50; and cf. Lane v. Garrison
(1922) 293 Mo. 530, 239 S. W. 813. Influenced by the undesirability of
starving the present generation to accumulate unbounded luxuries for the
future, England early passed a statute narrowly limiting this practice.
(1800) 39 and 40 George III, c. 98. This has been copied in several Ameri-
can states, with varying modifications, but the Missouri legislature has
never seen fit to adopt such a measure, perhaps because no case has as
yet arisen in this state bringing the possible evils into striking prominence.
R. S. Ill. (Cahill, 1931) ch. 3 sec. 145; C. S. N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) ch. 42
sec. 16; Vierling, The Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to Trusts (1924)
9 ST. Lojis L. R.v. 286. G. W. S., '33.
POuCE POwER-EXERCISE FOR AESTHETIC PURPoSE-EREmOoN OF
SCREEN BY STATE To HIDE SIGN FROM MOTORISTS' VIE.-The state highway
department erected a screen in front of plaintiff's property so that motor-
ists would not see a sign on plaintiff's property. Held, such action could be
enjoined as a deprivation of property rights. The court, in its opinion, ob-
served: "The original motive in erecting the screen was purely aesthet-
ic. . . It is contended that under the police power of the state this
screen may be erected. Courts have gone far in upholding the police power,
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but never to the extent demanded here." Perlmutter v. Greene (1931) 249
N. Y. S. 495.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held, and the great ma-
jority of state courts have agreed, that the police power of the states does
not extend to the protection or preservation of aesthetic sensibilities. Com-
monwealth v. Boston Advertising Co. (1907) 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745;
Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co. (Md. 1916) 98 At. 547; Welch v. Swasey
(1908) 214 U. S. 91. Yet the erection of billboards in residential dis-
tricts and the otherwise injudicious distribution of signs which ruined the
appearance of beautiful boulevards and became an eyesore to motorists,
gave the courts an urgent problem to solve. When the case of Thos. Cusack
Co. v. Chicago (1916) 242 U. S. 526, arose, counsel for the advertising
company called the Court's attention to the fact that the real purpose of
the ordinance in that case, which prohibited the construction of billboards
over twelve feet square without the consent of a certain portion of the
property owners, was to preserve the beauty of residential neighborhoods.
Faced with this strong argument and yet knowing of the great need for
billboard regulation, the Supreme Court found a way out by saying that
possibly the ordinance was passed actually to protect public morals, because
billboards might be hiding places for criminals, and thus be subversive of
public morality. The supreme courts of nearly all the states have justified
the regulation of outdoor advertising on similar grounds, not yet espousing
aesthetic basis. §t. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis (1911)
235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929; Horton v. Old Colony Bill Posting Co. (1914)
36 R. I. 507, 90 Atl. 822; Passaic v. Patterson Bill-Posting Adv. & Sign Ptg.
Co. (1904) 71 N. J. Law 75, 58 Atl. 343. In view of the present attitude
of the United States Supreme Court that the police power of the states
does not extend to the protection of the aesthetic sense, the principal case
was certainly decided properly; if a state cannot prevent a man from
erecting an unsightly billboard on his property for aesthetic reasons, then
it certainly cannot do it indirectly by putting a screen in front of his sign.
If the police power can be exercised in the public interest to protect the
sense of smell against smoke or offensive odors, Northwestern Laundry Co.
v. Des Moines (1915) 239 U. S. 486; Slaughter-House Cases (1873) 16
Wall. 36, and to protect the sense of hearing against loud noises, New
Orleans v. Fargot (1906) 116 La. 369, 40 So. 735, it becomes pertinent to
inquire why it cannot be exercised to protect the sense of sight? State
ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 1. c. 283, 97 So. 440, 1. c.
444. Zoning laws are generally upheld at present on the ground of public
health and welfare. But undoubtedly the aesthetic purpose plays a strong
part in their passage. A possible factor in the Supreme Court's refusal to
recognize that the police power may be exercised in the preservation and
protection of the communal aesthetic sensibilities is that it is doubtful that
a sufficiently definite criterion of aesthetic desirability may be developed.
Yet it may not be asserted that the denial of the right of public regulation
is so fixed that an intensification of the evil and a growing public sentiment
in regard to it may not ultimately reflect themselves in the judicial reaction.
J. D. F., '32.
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